of the special needs exception in the public school setting." In January 1998, in Todd v. Rush County Schools,' 2 the Seventh Circuit followed this trend and held that random suspicionless drug testing of high school students participating in any extracurricular activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 13 In light of Supreme Court precedent dealing with suspicionless drug testing, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly applied the special needs exception by neglecting to recognize the narrow circumstances that justified the holding in Vernonia.
In 1996, the School Board of Rush County, Indiana, enacted a drug testing program that prohibited high school students from participating in any extracurricular activities or driving to and from school 14 unless the students and their parents or guardians consented to random urinalysis testing for drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. 15 A positive test result barred a student from extracurricular activities and driving to and from school unless she could produce either a valid explanation or, upon retesting, a negative test result. 16 As a consequence of their parents' refusal to consent to drug testing, the plaintiff students were barred from participating in any extracurricular activity.1 7 The plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action against the Rush County School District claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 8 The district court granted the school district's motion for' summary judgment, 1 9 finding the Rush County program sufficiently similar to the program in Vernonia to uphold the Rush County drug-testing program.
The Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc. 30 In dissent, Judge Ripple 31 argued that extending Vernonia to apply to all students participating in extracurricular activities ignores the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler v. Miller. 3 2 Judge Ripple explained that Chandler struck down the testing program because the targeted group neither had a "high degree of drug use" nor performed "highly sensitive safety-related tasks" that would justify the testing. 21 See Todd, X33 F.3d at 987. 22 Judges Manion and Evans joined Judge Cummings's opinion. 23 864 F.2d 1309, 1998 WL 569114 ( 7 th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998), emphasized this point. See id. at *6 'Mn Vernonia and Todd drug testing could be construed as part of the 'bargain' a student strikes in exchange for the privilege of participating in favored activities."). ( refusing to apply the special needs exception to a testing program that required certain state office candidates to submit to drug testing); see Todd, 139 F.3d at 571 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 33 Todd, I39 .3d at 572 (Ripple, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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Judge Ripple applied this reasoning to Todd: " [T] here is ... certainly no showing that the targeted group, all students participating in any extracurricular activity, presents a particularized need." 34 The Seventh Circuit failed to address critical distinctions between the targeted groups in Vernonia and Todd and thus erroneously likened Rush County's drug testing program to the one in Vernonia. As Judge Ripple's dissent suggested, 3 5 the court ignored the clear command of precedent that, when suspicion-based testing will not adequately address the problem in a special needs setting, suspicionless testing of groups is reasonable, 36 but only to the extent that there is a recognizable correlation between the targeted group and the problem to be addressed. Creating a testing program in light of this correlation limits testing to those groups that are actually suspected of engaging in the proscribed activity. The Seventh Circuit's failure to consider the lack of correlation in Rush County allows the school to test any number of students without a modicum of suspicion of drug use and therefore provides no limitation for who can be tested. The Supreme Court's previous decisions concerning suspicionless drug testing emphasized that testing should be limited to groups that correlate with a drug problem. 38 First, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 39 the Court applied the special needs exception in upholding a suspicionless drug-testing program designed to test railroad employees after they were involved in an accident, 40 which cer- ' 
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RECENT CASES tainly created a reasonable suspicion of drug use. Second, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 4 1 the Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service agents, but limited its holding to those agents whose drug use would create a unique danger to others. 42 Third, in Vernonia, the Court justified the drug testing of high school athletes by emphasizing that members of the athletic teams were believed to be the "leaders of the drug culture." 43 In all three cases, there existed a reason to suspect a clear correlation between the target group and a drug problem. Finally, drawing upon these decisions, the Court in Chandler refused to extend the special needs doctrine to allow drug testing of certain state office candidates because "[i]n contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's certification requirement was not well designed to identify candidates who violated antidrug laws." 44 The Chandler Court, therefore, found that the lack of a correlation between the target group and the drug problem warranted striking down the testing scheme. 45 The Seventh Circuit erred by not finding dispositive the fact that there was no showing of a correlation between participants in extracurricular activities and drug use at Rush County High School. 46 The district court admitted that there was "very little to indicate that stu-41 489 U.S. 656 (r989). 42 See id. at 678-79. Although there was no notable drug use among Customs Service agents, the Court found that there was a unique risk involved with their use of drugs because of the safety-sensitive nature of their duties. See id. at 671 ("Customs employees ... plainly 'discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.'"); see also Chandler, I17 S. Ct. at 1304 (explaining that "[h]ardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique context" in which Customs Service agents were exposed to illegal drugs on a daily basis). Under Von Raab, the suspicionless drug testing of a group that is not suspected of actual drug use requires that an extraordinary risk of harm result from a single member's drug use. In Von Raab, agents who were constantly exposed to drugs were authorized to use deadly force and carry a firearm; an agent's use of drugs could have had disastrous consequences. Such dramatic risks do not exist in the public school context. dents in extracurricular activities were 'ringleaders' of a drug rebellion, as in Vernonia, ''47 and the only substance-related injury linked to extracurricular activities occurred during a single athletic event in the 197OS. 45 The court's failure to consider the lack of correlation in its decision completely removes the element of suspicion from the determination of who should be subjected to testing, 49 and as a result, future application of its rationale would warrant testing every student.
50
The Supreme Court did not. intend to sanction such a broad and invasive search in Vernonia. 5 x Furthermore, such a broadly applied intrusion of privacy is exactly what the Court sought to avoid in Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler when it emphasized the need to tailor the testing program narrowly.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Todd ignored the Court's correlation limitation expressed in similar cases. As a result, the court sanctioned a broad intrusion of students' privacy interest without any modicum of suspicion, which only serves to erode further the importance of suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
2
47 Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 8o5 (S.D. Ind. 1997). The district court claimed that these facts were insignificant because "when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake." See id. at 8o6 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the district court's argument relies on the unreasonable assumption that reasonable guardians suspect their wards of drug use and consequently would subject them to drug testing despite the fact that there is no showing that they actually are at risk of using drugs. 48 See id. at 803. 49 It could be argued that the determination of exactly which cases present a sufficient correlation between drug use and the targeted group to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny presents judges with a question of degree that has no clear answer. However, the inability to draw clear lines for judges to determine the outcomes of specific cases is inherent in the nature of the balancing test used in applying the special needs doctrine. See supra sources cited in note io. Furthermore, even if relying upon a correlation between drug use and the targeted group creates a spectrum of instances in which the special needs doctrine should be applied, it is clear that Todd falls at the no correlation end of the spectrum. 50 In fact, the larger the group that a school seeks to target is, the more likely it is that the program will be upheld because it will be less likely that individualized suspicion will be able to address the problem. See Willis II v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114, at *7 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998) (comparing the efficacy of individualized suspicion to identify drug users in any extracurricular activity with identifying drug users among those suspended from school and concluding that individualized suspicion is less effective for the former because it is the larger, less observed group 3 The five factors are: (i) whether the methodology upon which the testimony is based has been, or can be, tested; (2) whether the methodology "has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) the methodology's "known or potential rate of error"; (4) the availability and use of standards to control the methodology's operation; and (5) the extent to which the methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-95. The district court disallowed Dr. Jenkins's proposed testimony on causation, 17 and a jury determined that the defendants' negligence had not proximately caused Moore's illness.' 8 The Moores appealed, claiming that the district court had erred in excluding Dr. Jenkins's testimony. 9 After an en barc hearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. According to the court of appeals, Dr. Jenkins's testimony failed to meet that standard.
2 6 The court found that because Dr. Jenkins had never before treated a patient who had contracted RADS from exposure to toluene, Dr. Jenkins's personal training and experience only indirectly supported his testimony. 27 The court further determined that given the absence of a systematic study suggesting a connection between RADS and toluene, Dr. Jenkins's testimony lacked a solid foundation in the medical literature.
2 8 Finally, the court concluded that without other reliable evidence of causation, temporal proximity could not provide a reliable basis for Dr. Jenkins's opinion. Judge Benavides wrote a one-paragraph concurrence, emphasizing that because the issue was close, the result lay within the trial court's discretion. 30 Judge Dennis dissented. 3 1 He argued that under Daubert the key question is whether the proffered testimony is "soundly grounded in the methodology of the expert's discipline." 32 The district court had therefore erred in excluding the testimony of a physician who had arrived at his opinion through well-established medical techniques even though those techniques did not meet the rigorous expectations of hard science. 
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The Fifth Circuit correctly decided to apply Daubert to the expert testimony of a clinical physician. 34 Nevertheless, by reviewing the bases for Dr. Jenkins's opinion merely individually -without discussing their collective significance -the court created a misleading impression of how to implement the Daubert test. The court summarily assumed that the case fit the paradigm of the generic "toxic tort" 35 -a class of cases typically characterized by weak arguments for causation, which can be rendered reliable by only the most rigorous science. 36 Under this paradigm, the Fifth Circuit might have been fully justified in approaching the admissibility issue as it did -by sequentially examining, and rejecting, the separate bases for Dr. Jenkins's opinion. 37 The Fifth Circuit's approach was flawed, however, in that the court never justified its adoption of the toxic tort paradigm. Without such justification, the court's sequential analysis failed to explain why the evidentiary bases were "collectively inadequate." 3 The court demonstrated that each basis was itself insufficient to establish reliability. However, as the court acknowledged, these bases were not completely valueless. 39 39 According to the court, the material safety data sheet had "limited value," and temporal proximity carried "little weight." Id. at 278.
[VOL. I12:71 9 RECENT CASES mony from the individually inadequate -but not meaninglessbases with which Dr. Jenkins worked. 4 0 Having assumed that the toxic tort paradigm applied, the Fifth Circuit neglected to discuss this possibility. 4 1 Without strong support from at least one of the Daubert factors, Dr. Jenkins's opinion, which relied primarily upon a gestalt view of the evidence, lacked the rigor needed to untangle the complicated causal chain that the paradigm presupposed. 42 Given the Fifth Circuit's background assumptions, Dr. Jenkins's testimony could not be considered reliable.
Judge Dennis's dissent shows the consequences of a different vantage. For Judge Dennis, the proper paradigm was the classic "single plaintiff negligence action[]" 43 -the "slip and fall," 44 in which a failure of care essentially coincides with straightforward physiological harm. 45 In such a simple case, temporal proximity could establish 40 Hence, the analyses of the majority and the dissent followed not as much from the intrinsic quality of Dr. Jenkins's evidentiary bases, as from each side's perception of the essential nature of the case. Each side should have articulated and justified its background assumptions, rather than simply asserting derivative conclusions. The Fifth Circuit might still have found that. it could defend treating Moore like the paradigmatic toxic tort. 48 However, by explicitly defending its choice of paradigm, the court would at least have correctly signaled that in determining admissibility, a trial court must consider the overall nature of the case -as well as the individual strengths of an expert's evidentiary bases.
As Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc. illustrates, fully developed standards for admitting expert testimony are not likely to emerge soon. 49 Indeed, the current state of perplexity reflects a large and perhaps intractable problem of modern jurisprudence: the struggle between the paradigm of the mass toxic tort and that of the isolated individual accident. Judges should not seek to end such perplexity through reliance on disputable, yet unexplained, assumptions. In their desire to chart a course of collective progress, 0 judges should take heed that individual voyagers still sail in progress's wake. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows any "person claiming to be aggrieved" by an "unlawful employment practice" to file charges against the employer.' Because the Civil Rights Act is chiefly enforced through the actions of private citizens, 2 courts have typically construed the phrase "person claiming to be aggrieved" broadly in order to confer standing to the fullest extent available under Article III of the Constitution. 3 In January 1998, a split developed among the Courts of Appeals on the exact reach of the statute when the Fourth Circuit divided evenly en banc in Childress v. City of Richmond. 4 This division, which produced a per curiam opinion with no analysis, s affirmed a lower court's decision to deny Title VII standing to white male plaintiffs who alleged that their superior's disparaging comments toward blacks and women created a hostile working environment that impeded the plaintiffs' ability to cooperate with their coworkers and perform their jobs effectively. 6 In their opinions, both Judge Luttig, writing in concurrence with the Fourth Circuit, and Judge Williams of the district court evaded the substance of the plaintiffs' complaints, choosing to reinterpret the claims to fit more neatly into preconceived notions of gender and race relations. In so doing, both judges demonstrated a disregard for the value of a nondiscriminatory workplace.
In 1995, seven white male and two white female police officers filed suit against the City of Richmond and its Chief of Police. They 1 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5 (i994). Title VII defines an "unlawful employment practice" as employer discrimination "against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2oooe-2(a)(z). Title VII also forbids retaliation against employees who oppose unlawful practices or assist with investigations into unlawful practices. 7 The plaintiffs also claimed that after submitting a formal complaint questioning Lt. Carroll's "mental stability" they were subjected to "adverse treatment," constituting the additional Title VII violation of retaliation." Judge Williams, Senior District Judge, disallowed the plaintiffs' claims, 9 asserting that to establish discrimination under Title VII a plaintiff must demonstrate "membership in a protected class."' 10 He drew parallels to cases refusing to recognize claims for same-sex sexual harassment 1 to support the proposition that a member of one group cannot have "protected class" status with respect to another member of the same group. 12 Accordingly, he dismissed the white males' claims of gender discrimination, arid all of the plaintiffs' claims of racism. 13 He also dismissed the males' claims of retaliation on the ground that a successful retaliation claim can only be made if the underlying discrimination claim is, if not ultimately meritorious, at least "reasonable" -a threshold that these complaints did not reach.14 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the phrase "person aggrieved" in Title VII is sufficient to confer standing on white males who have suffered as a result of a hostile environment created by their supervisor's biases against others.' 16 in which, on the rationale that whites were deprived of the "benefits from interracial associations" when forced to live in segregated housing, standing had been extended to white plaintiffs suing under Title VIII to combat housing discrimination against blacks. 17 The Childress court highlighted the similarities in language between Title VII and Title VIII, and noted that all other circuits to consider the issue had granted Title VII standing to nonminority plaintiffs.', The court's judgment was vacated later that year' 9 and the case reheard en banc. 20 The en banc panel split evenly on the Title VII claims, thus reinstating the district court's ruling without additional comment in a per curiam opinion. 21 Judge Luttig wrote a separate concurrence to affirm his agreement with the district court 22 on the ground that Trafficante was not controlling precedent. 23 Judge Luttig noted that Title VIII, and not Title VII, provided a broad definition of the term "aggrieved person"; he interpreted the undefined use of the phrase "person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII to evince a congressional intent to import "prudential standing limitations" into the statute, rather than an intent to extend standing to the fullest extent allowable under the Constitution. 24 As such limitations include bars on third-party standing, Judge Luttig concluded that the claims of the white male plaintiffs must fail. 25 In their opinions, both Judge Luttig and Judge Williams addressed claims not actually advanced by the plaintiffs in order to deny them standing. Judge Luttig described the plaintiffs as "alleging] that their white male superiors made disparaging comments about black and female co-workers, thus subjecting these co-workers to a hostile work environment. '26 This statement is irreconcilable with the plaintiffs' brief, which alleged an environment hostile to all of the police officers, See id. at 121o n.3. He pointed out that harm to members of the majority forced to live in segregated housing had been mentioned during the subcommittee hearings on Title VIII as one of the evils the statute was designed to prevent, yet no similar history could be found to justify such an interpretation of Title VII. See id.
26 Id. at 1208 (emphasis added).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW including the plaintiffs themselves.
2 7 Yet Judge Luttig barely acknowledged this aspect of the plaintiffs' claims, 28 writing instead that the plaintiffs had complained of a work environment hostile "for blacks and women." 29 With this new interpretation of the plaintiffs' asserted injuries in hand, Judge Luttig had no trouble reaching the conclusion that Title VII's breadth is not commensurate with Article 11130 and therefore does not encompass "third-party" claims. 31 Though, filtered through Judge Luttig's lens, these claims surely were "third-party," this was not the plaintiffs' argument; rather, the plaintiffs claimed a violation of their own rights to be free of a discriminatory environment.
3 2 Authority for the validity of such a claim can be found in the Trafficante opinion's failure even to address the possibility that the claims of nonminority plaintiffs could be termed "third-party."
Judge Williams also argued that the officers were "attempting to recover for violations of other people's civil rights," 33 but unlike Judge Luttig, did not perceive the plaintiffs to be complaining of a work environment hostile to blacks and women. Rather, he conducted his analysis as though the officers were alleging discrimination against themselves in the form of "better treatment." 34 He concluded that a white male cannot discriminate against another white male on the theory that to be eligible for Title VII protection, a member of a group must be protected relative to someone else, namely, the person accused of acting in a discriminatory fashion. . 1971)) . 31 Judge Luttig also argued that Title VIII should be interpreted to confer broader standing than Title VII because Title VIII is enforced completely by private suits, whereas Title VII is enforced partially by suits brought by the EEOC. See Childress, 134 F.3d at 121o n.3 (Luttig, J., concurring). However, originally neither Title VIII nor Title VII allowed for agency enforcement, and thus there could have been no difference in congressional intent on this point. 34 Id. at 940 (emphasis removed) ("At its heart, the officers' Title VII claim either attempts to assert the civil rights of others or alleges that they were discriminated against by being provided ... better treatment than their black peers."). 36 decided only two months after the Fourth Circuit's holding in Childress. Judge Williams's insistence that a white male cannot be in a protected class with respect to another white male is plainly inconsistent with Oncale.
That the claim presented in Oncale hardly seems comparable to the situation in Childress only underscores Judge Williams's flawed reasoning, that is, his use of modes of analysis intended for more traditional Title VII cases. 37 Even in assessing the claims of retaliation, Judge Williams wrote that "the record does not show that the white male plaintiffs suffered discrimination for their gender or race, nor does it show that the white males' EEOC charge to that effect was the motivation for retaliation." 38 However, the plaintiffs were not claiming they themselves were discriminated against; rather, they were claiming that discrimination against their coworkers resulted in injuries to themselves by disrupting the relationships necessary for police officers to function. 3 9 By devoting the bulk of his argument to a claim the plaintiffs had not made, Judge Williams left the central question unanswered: Does Title VII authorize a remedy for injuries inflicted on a plaintiff as a result of illegal discrimination against another party?
Some insight into both judges' reasoning may be found in portions of their opinions suggesting that their approach to Title VII standing was less a product of statutory interpretation than an unacknowledged consideration of the merits of the officers' claims. 40 Although Judge Luttig wrote that the officers had complained of a breakdown in "esprit de corps," 4 1 he refused to interpret the plaintiffs' claims as alleging the presence of an environment hostile to themselves -implying that he did not sense the existence of such an environment. Similar threads are present in the district court's opinions: the plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor's actions created intolerable tensions in the workplace, but the district court repeatedly characterized Lt. Carroll's remarks -36 118 S. Ct. 998 (igg8). Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of that group." Id. at iooi (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (X977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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lantes" and his "pussy posse '4 2 -as somehow conferring a benefit on the male officers. The court asserted that the officers complained of "favoritism in [their] favor" 43 and portrayed their claimed interest not as a right to a discrimination-free workplace, but as one "to be free of tensions caused by special treatment. '44 This repeated recasting of the substance of the officers' claims reveals the unwillingness of Judges Luttig and Williams to perceive any injury to the officers, thus leading them to cloak their decisions on the merits in the rhetoric of standing. Both judges apparently conceive of race and gender relations as a zero-sum game in which a loss to one is a gain to another, in direct contrast to other courts, which have held that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act are meant to enforce the rights of all employees to benefit from "advantageous personal, professional or business contacts" free from the interference of a racially or sexually discriminatory environment. 45 The Act's purpose requires that all plaintiffs who allege injuries to themselves as a result of being deprived of a nondiscriminatory environment be able to sue in court and have the merits of their individual claims judged at trial, not through the concept of "standing." 42 Additionally, the district court held the officers' complaint to be so "spurious" that it could not even support a retaliation claim, see Childress, 919 F. Supp. at 219, despite abundant precedent from other circuits affirming the viability of such claims by nonminority plaintiffs. See cases cited supra note 6. The district court did not acknowledge this line of cases, writing instead that "the Court's research ... discloses no direct precedent for the instant case." Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939. Though none of the Childress opinions addresses the issue, it could be argued that Childress does differ from cases decided in other circuits in that the Childress plaintiffs sought both legal and equitable relief. Because the Civil Rights Act did not authorize monetary damages for emotional distress resulting from hostile work environments until the i99i amendments, see Winbush v. Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.8 (8th Cir. i995), none of the precedential circuit court decisions (all decided prior to I99i) confront the question whether standing should be extended to nonminority plaintiffs seeking money damages. However, neither the district court's opinion nor Judge Luttig's concurrence draws a distinction between legal and equitable remedies, and therefore they appear to deny standing for both kinds of claims. 45 Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 ( 9 th Cir. 1976). Courts and commentators have noted in a variety of contexts that a cooperative, diverse environment benefits all who are a part of it, not just those who were previously excluded. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 556 (299o) (noting the benefits of diversity in radio programming for both majority and minority listeners), tion device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain."
9 The Act allowed doctors to invoke the affirmative defense that D & X was the safest available means of abortion in a particular case, 1 0 and exempted suction curettage abortions.
I ' The Act also banned all post-viability abortions except to prevent death or "substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function" of the mother, and required viability testing for all nonemergency abortions after twenty-two weeks of pregnancy. 12 The district court granted an injunction, holding the ban on D & X abortions unconstitutionally vague and the ban on postviability abortions both unconstitutionally vague and insufficient in its protection of the mother's mental health. '22 In one of these "different methods," "some physicians" compress the skull by suctioning out the fetus's brain. '24 The court rejected the State's assertion that suctioning the brain at the end of such D & E abortions does not "terminate" the pregnancy as prohibited by the Act, because the fetus has already been "substantially dismembered. '25 The court interpreted the Act's reference to "termination of a human pregnancy" to mean the completion of the abortion, and thus held that the Act bans the subset of D & E abortions in which the brain is suctioned, even though the fetus is already dead.
26
In addition, the court found that the D & E abortion procedure was not exempted by the Act's suction curettage exception. 2 7 The court found that suction curettage was only "a step in [the] process" and that the exception did not cover the D & E procedure. 28 The court concluded that the Act "bans the use of both the D & E and D & X procedures" 29 and thus presents an unconstitutional "undue burden" under Casey. 30 Furthermore, Judge Kennedy ruled that the ban on post-viability abortions was unconstitutional in that the Act's exception for medical emergencies was vague (because it lacked a sufficient scienter requirement) and because it inadequately protected the mother's mental health 3 
31
See id. at 203-I1. Although recognizing that the state may, under Casey, proscribe postviability abortions except where deemed necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother, the court found vague the requirement that physicians determine the necessity for an abortion "in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment." Id. at 204 (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.i6(F) (Banks-Baldwin I998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court concluded that the phrase imposed both subjective and objective requirements, and
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Judge Boggs dissented, noting that federal courts "are to interpret statutes so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions where possible." '32 Judge Boggs observed that the majority had "strain[ed] to interpret" the Act "so as to make the burden ... appear 'undue.' 3 3 In response to the claim that the D & X ban includes some constitutionally protected D & E abortions, Judge Boggs stated that hearing testimony proved that "doctors who perform abortions have no difficulty discerning the conduct prohibited by the statute. '34 Judge Boggs also found that the statute's ban on post-viability abortions was not vague 35 and that severe mental harm would come within the Act's medical necessity exception. This expansive reading rests on the court's interpretation of the phrase "termination of a human pregnancy" to refer to a completed abortion relied on Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 0979), in which the Supreme Court ruled a statute unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear whether the statute imposed a purely subjective standard or a mixed subjective and objective standard. See Voinovich, 13o F.3d at 204 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391). Furthermore, the court rejected the state's assertion that the provision's initial phrase, "[n]o person shall purposely," imparts a scienter requirement to the medical necessity exceptions. Id. at 2o6 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A)). The court concluded that this scienter requirement applied only to the performance of an abortion and not to the determination of medical necessity. See id. Finally, although it stated that it "need not consider" the constitutionality of the Act's lack of a mental health exception, id., the court concluded that this absence was also unconstitutional, as it failed to protect the mother, see id. at 209.
32 Id. at 2 12 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 629 (1993) (stating that courts should "first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided" and that "a construction that would render a statute unconstitutional should be avoided" Moreover, the MPCP threatens impermissibly to entangle church and state by making religious schools dependent on government funding. The MPCP already stands to provide tens of millions of dollars to religious schools; as the program continues to grow, the funds at stake are sure to increase. Once religious schools depend on such funds to cover tuition costs, they are made subject to the governmental carrot and stick, and their religious freedom may thereby be compromised. Although the Jackson court accurately noted that Wisconsin currently imposes few eligibility requirements on MPCP schools, political circumstances can quickly change, and nothing would prevent the state in the future from conditioning eligibility on acceptance of controversial policies -for example, a requirement that birth control be taught in health courses, or that creationism not be taught in biology courses. 49 Precisely to avoid such conflicts, the Supreme Court has upheld "the cardinal principle that the State may not in effect become the prime supporter of the religious school system. '50 Yet the MPCP could easily have just. this effect.
In sum, the Jackson court should have struck down the MPCP. By upholding it, the court not only ignored precedent, but also failed to heed the dangers the Establishment Clause aims to suppress.
